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Jesrani: Updates from the International Criminal Courts

UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PROSECUTOR V. STANISLAV GALIC,
CASE NO. IT-98-29-T
On December 5, 2003, Trial Chamber I of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) delivered its judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. Stanislav
Galic. The indictment charged General Galic
with attacking and inflicting terror on civilian
populations as violations of the laws and customs of war as well as murder and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. The
seven-count indictment focused on Galic’s
alleged acts of sniping and shelling in and
around Sarajevo from September 1992 to
August 1994.

lations of the laws of war. In addition, the
majority found that hundreds of civilians were
killed and thousands were injured in these
attacks in the two-year period covered in the
indictment. Although Judge Nieto-Navia
authored a lone dissent, the majority found
that the attacks were part of a widespread and
systematic campaign against civilians, fulfilling
the chapeau requirements for crimes against
humanity. In essence, the majority found that
the SRK forces were guilty of each of the
crimes alleged in the indictment and stated
that it only had to rule on General Galic’s
responsibility in those crimes.

During the period covered in the indictment, General Galic was a commander of the
Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK), a branch of
the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), which
was embroiled in armed conflict with the
Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH). The
Prosecution alleged that Galic was criminally
responsible for a campaign of sniping and
shelling attacks on civilians in the parts of
Sarajevo controlled by ABiH with the primary
purpose of inflicting terror. The Prosecution
claimed that this campaign resulted in a large
number of deaths and injuries to civilians. The
Defense contested the allegations, claiming
that the civilian casualties were collateral to
legitimate military activity and resulted from
the targeting errors and stray bullets of both
warring factions.

The majority found General Galic guilty of
the crime of terror and dismissed the charges of
attacks of civilians as violations of the laws of
war. Both of these crimes are prohibited by
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and were read
into the ICTY Statute under the expansive
capability of Article 3. The majority noted that
this was the first time it had to pronounce on
the material and mental elements of the crime
of terror. The crime of terror has the same legal
elements as the crime of attack on civilians,
plus an additional mental element requiring
that the main purpose of the act be to spread
terror among the civilian population. Since the
law on cumulative convictions prohibits multiple convictions under different articles of the
statute for the same facts, and favors a conviction under the more specific provision, the
majority dismissed the charges of attacks on
civilian populations and upheld the conviction
of terror as a violation of the laws of war.

The Trial Chamber heard the testimony of
171 witnesses and viewed a large number of
visual exhibits. The group of witnesses included victims of the attacks, international military
personnel stationed in Sarajevo, and members
of the armed forces of both parties to the conflict. The majority found that civilians in
Sarajevo were attacked generally during the
day and that the attacks were not in response
to any military threat. In addition, the majority determined that the attackers could easily
tell that their victims were engaged in everyday
civilian activities. These findings fulfilled the
requirements for the chapeau elements of vio-

The majority next considered Galic’s
responsibility in the crimes SRK committed
during the period covered in the indictment.
The majority stated that the sniping and
shelling activity of the SRK was under the control of SRK’s chain of command and that Galic
had the authority to punish those who contravened his orders, violated military discipline,
or committed crimes. The majority thus found
that Galic had “effective control” of SRK
troops. In addition, the majority found that
Galic was well aware of the unlawful activities
of his troops. However, the majority noted that
Galic not only knew of the activities of his sub61

ordinates, but controlled the pace and scale of
those crimes. This finding was made based on
several testimonies that after pressure had been
applied to General Galic to stop the shootings,
they would occur less frequently. However, the
shootings would again increase in intensity as
the pressure abated. Finally, the majority found
that Galic occupied a position of corps commander in the VRS, a very senior position of
public trust and duty, and repeatedly breached
that duty and trust, which counted as an aggravating factor in determining his punishment.
The majority sentenced General Galic to a single term of 20 years’ imprisonment, with credit for the time spent in detention.
The judgment in this case is important
because it is the first time a conviction for the
crime of terror has been issued by the ICTY.
Article 3 of the Statute includes violations of
the laws of war, enumerating some specific
crimes but leaving open the possibility for the
tribunal to prosecute others not appearing in
the Statute. Although terror is not specifically
listed in the Statute, the ICTY can prosecute it
based on its inclusion in the Geneva
Conventions. Such a reading gives the ICTY
considerable flexibility in prosecuting criminals. It is unrealistic to expect that the drafters
of a tribunal statute will foresee all of the
potential crimes that may need to be adjudicated. The ability to expand to fit different crimes
and circumstances will make the effective prosecution of more crimes possible under international criminal law.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
PROSECUTOR V. JEAN DE DIEU
KAMUHANDA,
CASE NO. ICTR-95-54A-T
On January 22, 2004, Trial Chamber II of
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment in the
case of Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda.
The original nine-count indictment charged
Kamuhanda with conspiracy to commit genocide; genocide; complicity in genocide; murder,
extermination, rape and other inhumane acts as
crimes against humanity; and outrages of personal dignity, killing, and violence as serious
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violations of Common Article 3 and Optional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
Kamuhanda was charged with individual criminal responsibility under articles 6(1) and 6(3)
of the ICTR Statute for all the above-mentioned crimes. Kamuhanda was arrested in the
French town of Bourges in November 1999 on
a warrant from the ICTR, the first such arrest
in France. On August 20, 2002, following the
end of the Prosecution’s case, the Trial Chamber
partly granted a Defense motion and entered a
judgment of acquittal in the charge of conspiracy to commit genocide.

Tutsis, and telling them that he would return to
start the killings. The Chamber found that
Kamuhanda returned on the afternoon of April
12, 1994 and verbally ordered the killings to
start. The Chamber found Kamuhanda guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of instigating,
ordering, and aiding and abetting the killing of
members of the Tutsi ethnic group in the
Gikomero Compound, and therefore guilty of
genocide. Because of this finding and the rule
on cumulative convictions discussed above, the
Chamber could not find Kamuhanda also
guilty of complicity in genocide on the same
facts, and the charge was dismissed.

Analysis

The Trial Chamber found Kamuhanda
guilty of extermination as a crime against
humanity, not guilty of rape and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, and dismissed the count of murder as a crime against
humanity. The Chamber found that the
attacks on Tutsi refugees during April 1994
occurred on a mass scale and that this constituted a widespread and systematic attack
against a civilian population for purposes of
the chapeau elements of Article 3 of the
Statute. Next, the Chamber ruled that there
was insufficient distinction between the general allegations of murder and extermination.
Further, because of the law relating to cumulative convictions, the charge of murder was
thereby dismissed. The Chamber noted that
extermination requires an element of mass
destruction, and that a single killing or a limited number of killings will not be sufficient.
The Chamber also noted that the attack must
be directed against a group, rather than specific individuals, and that the killings at
Gikomero compound satisfied this requirement. In addition, Kamuhanda participated in
the attack and was fully aware that his actions
formed part of the widespread attack, therefore
,the Chamber found him guilty of extermination as a crime against humanity. Finally, the
Chamber found the evidence adduced in support of the allegation of rape and other inhumane acts was not sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Kamuhanda was individually criminally responsible for those acts.

Between January 1, 1994, and July 17,
1994, the period covered by the Indictment,
there were widespread attacks against the ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda, especially beginning on
April 6, 1994. The Prosecution argued that
Kamuhanda played a role in the April 1994
massacres of Tutsi refugees in the Gikomero
Parish Compound and Gishaka Catholic
Parish. The Prosecution stated that
Kamuhanda had distributed firearms,
grenades, and machetes to civilian militia on
several occasions and was an influential member of the Republican Movement for National
Democracy and Development (MRND), a
Hutu extremist political group and militia.
The Prosecution also charged that Kamuhanda
was responsible for rapes of Tutsi refugees
before their murders committed during the
same attacks.
Next, the Trial Chamber ruled that the
Prosecution failed to present specific evidence
of a superior-subordinate relationship between
Kamuhanda and the militias involved in the
attacks in question to show that he had “effective control” of the latter under 6(3) of the
ICTR Statute, which covers superior criminal
responsibility. The Trial Chamber noted that
this was not inconsistent with the finding
under 6(1) that Kamuhanda had “ordered” the
attacks. The Chamber noted that the two categories for responsibility were distinct and it
would only consider the elements of individual
criminal responsibility in this case.
The Trial Chamber found Kamuhanda
guilty of genocide and dismissed the charge of
complicity in genocide. The Chamber noted
that Kamuhanda exhibited “intent to destroy,
in whole or in part” the Tutsi ethnic group by
addressing a meeting at the home of one of his
cousins at the Gikomaro compound, inciting
those attending the meeting to start killing

The Trial Chamber then considered the
requirements for applicability of serious violations of the Geneva Conventions: that
Kamuhanda committed the alleged crimes
against persons not taking active part in the
hostilities, the alleged acts were committed in
the context of an internal armed conflict, and
that a nexus existed between the alleged acts
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and the armed conflict. The Chamber noted
that under this charge, it was necessary for the
Prosecution to prove that Kamuhanda was a
member of the armed forces or that by virtue
of his authority as a public civilian official, he
was mandated or expected to support the war
efforts. The Chamber then stated that the
Prosecution failed to show how and in what
capacity Kamuhanda supported the government effort against the Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF). Therefore, there was no requisite nexus
between Kamuhanda’s alleged crimes and the
armed conflict and the Trial Chamber found
Kamuhanda not guilty of serious violations of
the Geneva Conventions.
Conclusion
The Trial Chamber, having found
Kamuhanda guilty of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity, considered the appropriate sentence. It found no
mitigating factors, despite the fact that
Kamuhanda was widely regarded as a good
man who had done much to help his commune and country. The Chamber then found
that the high position Kamuhanda held as a
civil servant and an intellectual an aggravating
factor especially because he should have
known and appreciated the dignity and value
of life and the peaceful coexistence between
communities. Therefore, the Trial Chamber
sentenced Kamuhanda to two terms of life
imprisonment for genocide and extermination
as a crime against humanity.
This case is noteworthy because it is the
third conviction of a Minister of the government of Rwanda, reinforcing the ICTR’s commitment to prosecuting those most responsible
for the genocide in Rwanda regardless of rank
or position in society and further chipping
away at the principle of sovereign immunity
traditionally accorded to state officials. Finally,
Kamuhanda was arrested and extradited from
France to the ICTR, which shows the level of
cooperation UN member states have contributed to secure prosecutions of war criminals and ensure accountability and the proper
functioning of the international tribunals.
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